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Abstract: 
 
Advances in information technologies enable firms to collect detailed consumer data and target 
individual consumers with tailored ads. Consumer data are among the most valuable assets that 
firms own. An interesting phenomenon is that competing firms often trade their consumer data 
with each other. Based on a common-value all-pay auction framework, this paper studies the 
advertising competition between two firms that target the same consumer but are asymmetrically 
informed about the consumer value. We characterize firms' equilibrium competition strategies. 
The results show that better consumer information does not help the better-informed firm save 
the advertising expenditure but does enable it to reap a higher expected profit in competition. 
Sharing individual-level consumer data may soften the competition even though firms compete 
head-to-head for the same consumer. We also find that the better-informed firm may sell its data 
to its competitor but never voluntarily shares it with its competitor. 
 
Keywords: advertising | all-pay auction | common-value auction | information asymmetry | 
information sharing | target marketing 
 
Article: 
 
Advances in consumer-tracking technologies enable firms, especially e-commerce firms, to 
collect a large amount of individual-level consumer data. For example, an investigation by the 
Wall Street Journal [2] indicates that the 50 most popular Web sites in the United States installed 
a total of 3,180 tracking files on a single computer. The tracking files, such as cookies, beacons, 
and video cookies, help firms record online behaviors of individuals, including specific pages 
visited, browsing trails from one site to another, searches made, and clickthroughs to specific 
content or ads. This data enables firms to estimate the value of consumers and target individual 
consumers with tailored ads. The market for target advertising is growing fast. Worldwide online 
target advertising spending is projected to exceed $2.6 billion in 2014 [17]. 
 investigation by the Wall Street Journal [2] indicates that the 50 most popular Web sites 
in the United States installed a total of 3,180 tracking files on a single computer. The tracking 
files, such as cookies, beacons, and video cookies, help firms record online behaviors of 
individuals, including specific pages visited, browsing trails from one site to another, searches 
made, and clickthroughs to specific content or ads. This data enables firms to estimate the value 
of consumers and target individual consumers with tailored ads. The market for target 
advertising is growing fast. Worldwide online target advertising spending is projected to exceed 
$2.6 billion in 2014 [17]. 
 The sharing of individual-level consumer data raises a question concerning the firm’s 
competition: Why do firms share their valuable consumer data when they compete for consumers 
head-to-head? Extant literature has examined firms’ incentives to share individual-level 
consumer data in various competitive settings (e.g., [9, 24, 30]). These studies are all under the 
premise that consumers have brand preferences that are exogenously given. The key insight is 
that sharing individual-level consumer information allows firms to better segment their 
consumers and develop differentiated pricing strategies. Each firm therefore focuses more on 
consumers preferring it and avoids aggressively competing for consumers preferring its 
competitor. However, the consumer behavior data collected online often reveals consumers’ 
intent to purchase products in certain categories, rather than their brand loyalty. For example, 
consumer searches for airfares on price comparison Web sites often indicate that consumers have 
intent to purchase trips. This data does not necessarily reveal which brand consumers are loyal to 
[27]. The search data for products, rather than brands, can be used by competing brands to send 
target ads. Sharing this data enables competing brands to better learn and target the same set of 
consumers. In this regard, the competition should be intensified by consumer data sharing. It is 
therefore not clear why firms would like to share this data with competitors and whether the 
business model of consumer data exchange is viable. 
 This paper studies consumer data sharing in a setting where firms compete for consumers 
head-to-head using individual targeting. Departing from the existing literature [9, 24, 30], we 
consider the case where consumers have no brand preference. What matters to firms is the 
consumer value. A valuable consumer has a higher consumption level and generates a higher 
revenue income to the firm (e.g., by spending more) than a nonvaluable consumer. Firms do not 
know a consumer’s true value. However, each of them can draw signals about the consumer 
value from its individual-level consumer data. Firms have asymmetric information—one firm 
has better consumer data and hence can draw more accurate signals than the other. Firms 
compete for consumers by sending target ads based on their information about the consumer. 
 We use this model to examine several issues. The first issue concerns the equilibrium of 
the firm competition. If firms are not symmetrically informed about the consumer value, how 
should they spend in targeting this consumer in competition? The second issue concerns the 
impact of information asymmetry on the firms’ advertising competition. How does information 
asymmetry influence firms’ advertising spending? When information asymmetry decreases, are 
firms better off or worse off? The last issue concerns consumer data sharing. Does the better-
informed firm have an incentive to share or sell its consumer data to the less-informed firm? To 
what extent should the better-informed firm share/sell its data? The answers to these questions 
generate important managerial implications. 
 The key findings of this study are as follows. First, this paper characterizes the 
equilibrium of firms’ competition in target advertising. It shows how firms’ advertising spending 
and profitability are dependent on their information about the consumer value. The study 
illustrates that when consumers have no brand preference, information asymmetry essentially 
creates differentiation between the ex ante homogeneous firms and helps them avoid destructive 
competition. The analysis generates a counterintuitive result on the firms’ spending in target 
advertising. Firms always spend the same amount, on average, in targeting a consumer despite 
their information difference. Better consumer information enables firms to focus their advertising 
spending on the more valuable consumers. Therefore, although the better-informed firm and the 
lessinformed firm incur the same level of expected expenditure in targeted advertising, the 
expected profit of the better-informed firm is higher than that of the less-informed firm. This 
finding provides an important insight on the role of consumer information in target advertising—
better information does not necessarily help a firm save on their advertising expenditure; rather, 
it may help the better-informed firm improve the effectiveness of its target advertising. 
 Second, this paper characterizes how information asymmetry influences the firms’ 
competition. Conventional wisdom may suggest that decreasing information asymmetry always 
intensifies the firms’ competition in targeting consumers. However, our analysis indicates that 
this is not the case. We find that even when firms compete head-to-head, decrease in information 
asymmetry may dampen the competition under certain conditions. We characterize these 
conditions in this paper. 
 Third, this paper examines the firms’ consumer data-sharing decisions. We find that the 
better-informed firm never gives away its data for free. The better-informed firm never directly 
benefits from the softened competition—its profit always decreases as the level of information 
asymmetry becomes lower. This result is in contrast to a key finding in the literature on 
individual targeting (e.g., [9]), which indicates that a firm is willing to voluntarily share its 
consumer information with its competitor. Even though voluntary sharing never occurs in this 
paper, the results show that the betterinformed firm is willing to sell its consumer data to its 
competitor. The study also finds that the degree of information sharing is dependent on the 
market condition that the better-informed firm perceives. When it is more likely for the better-
informed firm to receive a good signal on the consumer value and find the market more 
promising, the better-informed firm would like to sell more of its data to the competitor. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature. The 
third section outlines the model setup. The fourth section examines the equilibrium of firm 
competition in target advertising. The fifth section investigates consumer data sharing. Finally, 
the sixth section discusses the key managerial implications of this study and concludes the paper. 
 
Literature Review 
 
Our paper relates to the stream of information systems (IS) literature on price discrimination and 
product differentiation in e-commerce. Recent work in this stream examines how e-commerce 
firms may price-discriminate consumers using quality differentiation in digital products/services 
(e.g., [4, 20]) or digital bundling (e.g., [11, 15]). The availability of individual-level consumer 
data provides firms with more capability to tailor their prices and promotional offers. Firms tend 
to leverage such capability in competition. Therefore, the competition based on individual-level 
consumer information has also become a focus in the marketing literature (e.g., [8, 9, 24, 25, 34]) 
and the IS literature (e.g., [10, 28]). In the IS literature, for example, Mehra et al. [28] 
investigated the competitive upgrade discount pricing strategies based on consumer prior 
purchase behavior using a Hotelling model. Choudhary et al. [10] examined perfect price 
discrimination with knowledge of consumer values in a vertically differentiated duopolistic 
setting. The above studies focused mostly on the use of individual-level consumer information in 
competitive price discrimination. In our paper, we consider how firms use individual-level 
consumer information in target advertising competition. We also consider the issue of 
information sharing between firms when they have differentiated information about the 
consumers. 
 Target advertising has been analytically examined in different settings. For example, 
Esteban et al. [13] considered a monopolistic market where consumers have heterogeneous 
reservation prices. They found that by using target advertising, the monopolist advertises more to 
the consumers with higher reservation prices. In addition, the overall level of advertising is 
lower. Roy [33] studied a competitive market where two firms use advertising to target a group 
of consumers. He found that firms always target and sell to mutually exclusive market segments 
in which each firm acts as a purely local monopolist. Iyer et al. [21] studied target advertising in 
a competitive market where firms sell differentiated products to both customers with strong 
brand preferences and comparison shoppers. Target advertising enables firms to advertise less to 
comparison shoppers, creating differentiation and softening pricing competition. Chen and 
Stallaert [7] compared the price competition between advertisers using target advertising and 
using uniform advertising and found that behavior targeting can soften the advertisers’ 
competition. In these studies, competing firms are always equally informed about consumers. 
Our paper, in contrast, studies target advertising competition between firms when they are 
asymmetrically informed about the consumer value. 
 This study also relates to the literature on information sharing. The informationsharing 
literature includes both the studies that examine vertical information sharing between supply 
chain partners (e.g., [16, 22, 23]) and the studies that examine horizontal information sharing 
between competing firms (e.g., [9, 14, 24, 30, 37, 38, 39]). Chen [6] provides a comprehensive 
review of the supply chain management literature on vertical information sharing. Our study 
focuses on horizontal information sharing. The traditional literature on horizontal information 
sharing has investigated the sharing of general demand information between competing firms 
(e.g., [14, 37, 38, 39]). More recent literature focuses on the sharing of individual-level consumer 
data (e.g., [9, 24, 30, 36]). This paper is closely related to the latter stream of literature (i.e., the 
sharing of individual consumer data). In this literature, Taylor [36] studied the trading of 
individual customer information between firms that sequentially sell to the same set of customers 
and found that firms sell customer data if the customers are naive (i.e., do not anticipate the sale 
of their information). Our study, however, focuses on the case where two firms simultaneously 
compete for the same consumers. 
 There are several other studies that examine the horizontal sharing of individuallevel 
consumer data in competitive settings. Pagano and Jappelli [30] examined the credit market 
competition where two differentiated lenders (located in different towns) serve both local 
borrowers and moving borrowers, who can borrow from both lenders. Their study shows that 
information sharing benefits lenders by allowing them to better price-discriminate between local 
borrowers and moving borrowers in the future period, and hence softens the competition in the 
current period. Chen et al. [9] examined the situation where two firms sell differentiated products 
to both loyal customers and comparison shoppers. Firms cannot perfectly distinguish between 
comparison shoppers and the loyal customers. Chen et al.’s results show that information sharing 
helps firms improve the targetability and avoid overaggressively competing for each other’s 
loyal customers. In a two-period setting, Liu and Serfes [24] studied how the exchange of 
information softens competition between differentiated firms. Their analysis shows that 
information sharing not only makes firms less aggressive in acquiring market shares in the first 
period but also helps firms better price the product according to the customer preferences in the 
second period. The above studies examine the sharing of individual consumer data under the 
premise that consumers have heterogeneous brand preferences. Our research differentiates from 
these studies by investigating the sharing of individual consumer data between competing firms 
when consumers have no brand preference. In addition, the above studies focus on price 
competition, whereas our study examines the advertising competition between firms. 
 This paper also contributes to the literature on common-value auctions (CVA) with 
asymmetrically informed bidders. A CVA is an auction in which the bidders share the correlated 
but unknown values regarding the auctioned item. It is in contrast to the private-value auction, in 
which the bidders have independent private valuations of the auctioned item. In this paper, a 
consumer is of the same value to both firms upon being acquired but the firms are not equally 
informed about the consumer value. The firm competition can be considered as a CVA with 
asymmetrically informed bidders. While there is a large body of literature on auctions, CVAs 
with asymmetrically informed bidders have received less attention in the theoretical work on 
auctions. EngelbrechtWiggans et al. [12] and Milgrom and Weber [29] study CVAs in which 
only one bidder has private information (i.e., informed bidder) and show that in equilibrium the 
informed bidder in general makes a positive expected profit while other bidders make a zero 
profit. Banerjee [3] and Hausch [18] find that the less-informed bidder with private information 
may earn a positive expected profit. These studies focus on the common-value winner-pay 
auctions. Our paper shows that in a common-value all-pay auction, the less-informed firm with 
private information may make a positive profit. 
 The literature on CVAs has mixed findings on the value of information. Milgrom and 
Weber [29] show that by releasing the better-informed bidder’s information, the seller can 
increase its expected revenue. This is because information disclosure, which decreases 
information asymmetry, between bidders leads firms to compete more aggressively, and hence 
increases the expected revenue for the seller. Hausch [18] used a special case to illustrate that the 
seller’s expected revenue may be lower if the less-informed bidder receives better information. 
Banerjee [3] found that a change in the degree of asymmetry between bidders has an ambiguous 
effect on revenue. These papers focus on winner-pay auctions with conditional commitment of 
resources, that is, the winner pays the bid only when it wins the auction [1]. The advertising 
competition in our paper exhibits the feature of unconditional commitment—a firm incurs 
advertising costs regardless of winning. Therefore, our model can be characterized as a common-
value all-pay auction. Our analysis shows that the value of information sharing depends on the 
level of information asymmetry between firms—information sharing increases the total profit of 
firms (i.e., information sharing is valuable) when the level of information asymmetry between 
firms is high but reduces the total profit when the level of information asymmetry is low. 
 All-pay auctions have been used to model a variety of economic and social activities, 
such as rent seeking and lobbying, patent competition, contests and tournaments, and advertising 
and promotional competition [1, 32]. All-pay auctions with asymmetric bidders, while often 
observed, are underexplored. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that examines 
the competitive strategies and information-sharing decisions in a common-value all-pay auction 
with asymmetrically privately informed bidders. 
 
Model 
 
We consider two homogeneous firms advertising and selling to a group of consumers. From a 
firm’s perspective, a consumer can be either valuable or nonvaluable. We use T to denote the 
consumer’s type and let T = H (T = L) for a valuable (nonvaluable) consumer. A valuable 
consumer has a high consumption level and generates a positive revenue income to the firm 
during his or her lifetime relationship with the firm. A nonvaluable consumer, in contrast, has a 
low consumption level and cannot generate any revenue income to the firm in expectation. For 
example, BestBuy reported that bargain hunters bring hassle to the retailer by returning products 
and then buying them back at returned-merchandiser discounts, or by presenting price quotes 
from Web sites and demanding price matching to its lowest-price pledge [26]. Firms are not 
willing to serve such consumers because their spending is too low to cover the firms’ costs of 
serving them. We use V to represent the value of a consumer and let V = v for a valuable 
consumer and V = 0 for a nonvaluable consumer. We assume that a positive proportion of the 
consumers are valuable. Firms cannot directly observe whether a specific customer is valuable or 
nonvaluable. This is equivalent to the case where firms compete for a representative consumer 
and this consumer is valuable (nonvaluable) with a positive prior probability, pH = a (pL = 1 – 
pH). In the subsequent analysis, without loss of generality, we focus on the case with a 
representative consumer. 
 Firms use advertising to improve brand awareness and create demand. With individual-
level consumer data, firms can tailor ads to the representative consumer in content and intensity, 
that is, behavioral targeting. Since this paper focuses on the consumer’s ex ante interest in the 
product rather than the brand, we consider the case where firms tailor the intensity of ads (i.e., 
the amount of advertising spending) in targeting the consumer. The consumer eventually 
patronizes the firm that sends more ads to him or her. We use xi , i ∈ {1,2} to denote firm i’s 
advertising spending on the consumer. 
 onsumer. Even though firms cannot directly observe whether a specific consumer is 
valuable or nonvaluable, they often receive signals on the value of the consumer. For example, 
each firm may collect consumer profile and transaction data from its sales channels or acquire 
the data from marketing intelligence companies. In most practical situations, the firms have 
different information about the consumer. Without loss of generality, we assume that firm 1 has 
more information on the same set of consumers than firm 2. For example, when firm 1 sells its 
products via multiple channels and firm 2 sells only through a single channel, firm 1 is able to 
collect more data about a consumer via different channels. As a result, firm 1 has more detailed 
and richer data about the consumer. Based on this data, firm 1 can more thoroughly analyze the 
consumer and more accurately estimate the consumer’s value than firm 2. It is worth noting that 
our model can also capture the case where firm 1 has data on more consumers than firm 2. In this 
case, we can consider that only firm 1 is informed about the value of a specific consumer and 
firm 2 is completely uninformed. This is actually a special case of our model. 
 We model the firms’ information as follows. Firm 1 draws a private signal S from its data 
about the value of this consumer. This can be considered a case in which firm 1 analyzes its data 
and generates sales leads from the data. We assume that if a sales lead is generated from a 
consumer, this consumer can be either a valuable consumer or a nonvaluable consumer. If there 
is no sales lead from a consumer, the firm can conclude that he or she is a nonvaluable consumer. 
For example, if the data show that a consumer has made a few purchases over the past three 
months, this signals that this consumer could potentially be a valuable consumer. However, it is 
still possible that this consumer may not be valuable. If the data show that the consumer has been 
inactive for a long period of time, this consumer is considered as a nonvaluable consumer. 
Mathematically, we assume that S can be either high (h) or low (l). Firm 1 always draws a high 
signal from a valuable consumer and draws a high signal from a nonvaluable consumer with 
probability We use pS|T to represent the probability that firm 1 draws a signal S ∈ {h,l} from 
a consumer with type T ∈ {H,L} and let 
 
 
 
We use ps to denote the probability that firm 1 draws a signal S ∈ {h,l} and 
 
 
The posterior probabilities of the consumer’s type T ∈ {H,L} after firm 1 receives a signal S 
∈ {h,l} are given by 
 
 
 
To evaluate the informativeness of firm 1’s signals, we compare the posterior probabilities pT|S 
with the prior probabilities pT and have 
 
 
 
Inequality (1) indicates that when firm 1 receives a high signal, S = h, firm 1 is more 
confident that the consumer is a valuable consumer. Inequality (2) indicates that when firm 1 
receives a low signal, S = l, firm 1 is more confident that the consumer is a nonvaluable 
consumer. Firm 1’s consumer data is therefore informative. 
We use E[V|S] to represent the expected value of the consumer for firm 1 given a signal 
S ∈ {h,l}, and 
 
 
 
It is assumed that firm 2 cannot observe firm 1’s signal S. Firm 2 draws from its data a 
different signal . The value of can be either high or low .  is correlated with S but is 
less accurate than S (as shown below). The signals are likely to be correlated because firms target 
the same consumer.2 Let pS|S denote the probabilities of receiving ∈  conditional on S ∈ 
{h,l}. The probabilities pS|S are defined as follows: 
 
 
 
where t ∈ [0, 1] captures the similarity level of  relative to S. When , the two firms have 
the same signals about the consumer and, therefore, there is no information asymmetry between 
them. When , firm 2’s signal is less informative than firm 1’s signal (as illustrated below) 
and there is information asymmetry between firms. In particular, when  = 0, the signal does 
not provide any additional information to firm 2 because given an S, firm 2 draws  = or  = 
with equal probability (0.5). As  increases,  conveys more similar information as S and 
information asymmetry between the firms decreases. We assume that  is common knowledge. 
Even though a firm cannot observe the signals of its competitor, it is aware of the richness of the 
data that the competitor possesses. For example, a firm is often aware of the variety of channels 
from which the other firm serves its consumers and thus acquires consumer data. In this regard, 
even if the firm cannot directly observe its competitor’s consumer data, it can infer to what 
extent its competitor’s consumer data is rich for analysis. 
 Based on Equation (3), we derive the probabilities for firm 2 receiving a signal 
 
 
 
 
We use to denote the posterior probabilities of the consumer’s type T ∈ {H,L} after firm 2 
draws a signal Using Bayes’s rule, we get 
 
 
 
To evaluate the informativeness of firm 2’s signals, we compare the posterior probabilities 
with the prior probabilities pT and have 
 
 
Inequality (6) shows that when both firms receive high signals (firm 1 receives S = h and 
firm 2 receives ), firm 1 is more confident that the consumer is a valuable consumer than 
firm 2. Inequality (7) shows that when both firms receive low signals (firm 1 receives S = l and 
firm 2 receives ), firm 1 is more confident than is firm 2 that the consumer is a nonvaluable 
consumer. Therefore, firm 1’s signal is more accurate (or more informative) than firm 2’s, and 
firm 1 is better informed than firm 2. Given the signal , the expected value of the consumer to 
firm 2 is 
 
 
 
where and are posterior probabilities of S = h and S = l, respectively, conditional on 
. Using Bayes’s rule, we get 
 
 
Then we can show the following relationship among the expected values: 
 
Lemma 1:  
 
Lemma 1 suggests that a higher signal  is less likely to indicate a valuable consumer 
than S = h. Similarly, a low signal  is less likely to indicate a nonvaluable consumer than S 
= l. This further confirms that the signal provides less accurate information than the signal S. 
All the proofs are in the Appendix.  
The sequence of events in our model is as follows. First, firm 1 (the better-informed firm) 
decides whether and how to share consumer data with firm 2. Second, both firms draw their 
private signals about the consumer from their consumer data (i.e., firm 1 observes S and firm 2 
observes ). Third, both firms simultaneously determine their advertising spending, xi (i = 1,2), 
in targeting the consumer. Fourth, the firm that spends more in advertising wins the consumer 
and gains a revenue V from this consumer. Figure 1 illustrates the timing of events. Both the 
firms and the consumer are risk-neutral. We assume that everything is common knowledge 
except the consumer’s value V and the two private signals S and . We use backward induction 
to solve the game. The next section investigates the firms’ competitive strategies in target 
advertising. The Sharing Consumer Data section examines the firms’ consumer data-sharing 
decisions, given the subgame equilibrium characterized in the next section. 
 
Firm Competition 
 
This section examines the Bayesian equilibrium of the firm advertising competition. 
Since the consumer’s true value is the same for both firms and target advertising is costly for 
firms, the firm competition has the same features of a common-value allpay auction. We thus use 
a common-value all-pay auction framework to analyze the competition game. In the competition, 
firm i (i = 1,2) chooses its advertising spending, xi, to maximize its expected profit from the 
consumer,  . We find that there exists no pure-strategy equilibrium for the firm competition. 
The rationale is that if firm 2 spends a deterministic amount x2 in advertising, firm 1’s best 
response is always to spend more than x2 as long as E[V|S] > x2 . As a result, firm 2 wins the 
consumer only when E[V|S] ≤ x2 , which yields a nonpositive expected profit for firm 2. This is a 
typical case of the winner’s curse. Therefore, firm 2 must use a randomized strategy in the 
equilibrium. In marketing, mixed strategies can be interpreted as the frequent dispersion of 
firms’ sales offers or promotions.  
Let F1 (x|S) = Pr(x1 ≤ x|S) denote firm 1’s mixed strategy in equilibrium, where F1 (x|S) is 
the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of firm 1’s randomized advertising spending 
conditional on the signal S. Similarly, let = ) denote firm 2’s mixed strategy in 
equilibrium, where  is the CDF of firm 2’s randomized advertising spending conditional on 
the signal . Then firm 1’s expected profit function can be represented as 
 
 
 
 
 
The first term on the right-hand side of Equation (10) is firm 1’s expected revenue in 
competition when firm 2 draws . The second term is the expected revenue when firm 2 
draws . And the third term is firm 1’s advertising spending. Similarly, firm 2’s expected 
profit function can be represented as 
 
 
 
 The first term on the right-hand side of Equation (11) is firm 2’s expected revenue in 
competition when firm 1 draws S = h. The second term is firm 2’s expected revenue when firm 1 
draws S = l. And the third term is firm 2’s advertising spending. 
 Proposition 1 characterizes the firms’ equilibrium advertising strategies  and 
 for the case of  that is, firm 1 is more likely to draw a low signal: 
 
Proposition 1: When ph ≤ pl, the firms’ equilibrium strategies can be characterized as 
follows: 
 
(a) When S = l, firm 1 spends zero in target advertising (i.e., no targeting). When S = h, 
firm 1 spends in target advertising according to 
 
 
(b) When  firm 2 spends zero in target advertising. When  firm 2 spends in 
target advertising according to 
 
 
 To help understand Proposition 1, Figure 2a depicts the support of the firms’ randomized 
advertising spending. When  firm 1’s advertising strategy can be explained as follows. 
Firm 1 estimates the consumer value and decides its advertising spending based on its signal S. 
When firm 1 draws S = l, it expects that the consumer value is E[V|l] = 0. Therefore, firm 1 does 
not target the consumer at all. When firm 1 draws S = h, it expects that the consumer value is 
E[V|h]. Based on Lemma 1, we have that E[V|h] > and firm 2 never spends 
more than . Firm 1 randomizes its advertising spending over . 
 
 
 
Similarly, firm 2 estimates the consumer value and decides its advertising spending based 
on its signal  When firm 2 draws  , it expects that the consumer value is  (the 
equality holds if and only if ). However, we find that firm 2 does not spend in advertising 
either. This is a due to the concern of the winner’s curse. When firm 2 draws  firm 1 may 
have either a high signal S = h or a low signal S = l. If firm 1 draws S = l, it does not target this 
consumer because E[V|l] = 0. In this case, even though firm 2 can win the consumer by spending 
a positive amount in advertising, firm 2’s profit is negative (i.e., the winner’s curse). If firm 1 
draws S = h, firm 1 will advertise aggressively such that firm 2 never earns a positive expected 
profit in equilibrium. As a result, firm 2 can never do better than not advertising at all. This is 
why firm 2 spends zero when . When firm 2 draws  firm 2 randomizes its advertising 
spending over the support  
Proposition 2 characterizes the firms’ equilibrium advertising strategies when ph > pl, that 
is, firm 1 is more likely to draw a high signal: 
 
Proposition 2: When ph > pl, the firms’ equilibrium strategies can be characterized as 
follows:  
 
1. When S = l, firm 1 spends zero in target advertising. When S = h, firm 1 spends in 
target advertising according to 
 
 
2. When , firm 2 spends in target advertising according to 
 
 
 
When  firm 2 spends in target advertising according to 
 
 
 
where the cutoff levels  and are defined in the Appendix 
 
Figure 2b depicts the support of firms’ randomized advertising spending when ph > pl. 
Similar to the case of ph ≤ pl , firm 1 does not spend in target advertising when it draws a signal S 
= l. When firm 1 draws S = h, firm 1 randomizes its advertising spending but competes less 
aggressively than in the case of ph ≤ pl. This is indicated by the finding that the upper bound of 
firm 1’s advertising spending is less than . 
Since firm 1 competes less aggressively, firm 2 no longer finds it optimal to always spend 
zero when  . Instead, it becomes opportunistic and would like to spend in targeting the 
consumer, hoping to win if firm 1 draws S = h. As a result, firm 2 randomizes its advertising 
spending over the support , where  > 0. In other words, firm 1’s less aggressiveness 
motivates firm 2 to compete more aggressively when firm 2 draws . When firm 2 draws 
, it randomizes its advertising spending x2 over  
When ph > pl, firm 1 spends a positive amount in advertising only when it draws S = h. 
Firm 2 spends a positive amount in advertising both when  and when . Therefore, firm 
1 drawing S = h competes with firm 2 both when firm 2 draws  when firm 2 draws . 
This leads to a kink point at in firm 1’s CDF, F1 (x|h). 
When  = 0, firm 2’s information provides no additional message and only firm 1 has 
private information. This is a special case of the equilibria identified above. It is worth noting 
that when  = 1, the signals S and  are identical, that is, the firms always obtain the same 
information. The CDFs of the firms’ advertising spending are also identical. When they draw 
low signals, S = = l, neither firm spends in target advertising on this consumer. When they 
draw high signals, S = = h, they spend in target advertising following the same CDF: 
 
 
 
 The firms compete head-to-head, and their expected advertising spendings are always the 
same, that is, E[x1|h] = and E[x1] = E[x2]. When < 1, the firms obtain different 
information and spend following different CDFs as shown in Propositions 1 and 2. Proposition 3 
compares the firms’ expected advertising spending when information asymmetry between the 
firms exists, that is,  < 1: 
 
Proposition 3: When  < 1:  
 
 
 
3. Firms’ overall expected advertising spendings on the consumer are always equal, 
that is, E[x1] = E[x2]. 
 
When ph < pl, firm 1’s expected advertising spending when firm 1 draws S = h is higher 
than that of firm 2 when firm 2 draws  that is,  Lemma 1 shows that a 
signal S = h is a stronger predictor of a valuable consumer than a signal  Therefore, firm 1 
drawing S = h is more willing to spend in target advertising on the consumer than firm 2 drawing 
. When firms draw low signals (S = l for firm 1 or  for firm 2), they do not spend in 
target advertising, as shown in Proposition 1. 
When ph > pl, firm 1’s expected advertising spending when S = h is less than firm 2’s 
expected advertising spending when  , that is, . This also evidences that firm 
1 competes less aggressively when ph > pl. Instead of pursuing higher winning probabilities, firm 
1 chooses to save the advertising spending and bets on the chance that firm 2 draws a low signal 
S = l. Because firm 1 competes less aggressively, firm 2 no longer finds it optimal to give up the 
competition when it draws a low signal . Instead, firm } 2 would like to spend a positive 
amount in target advertising when , hoping to beat firm 1 when firm 1 draws S = h. 
Nevertheless, firm 1 with S = h still advertises more aggressively than firm 2 with , that is, 
Again, firm 1 does not spend in target advertising when it draws S = l. As a 
result, . 
Proposition 3 also presents an interesting finding—firms’ overall expected advertising 
spendings are always the same, despite their information difference. This result reveals an 
important role of information in the target advertising competition. In other words, better 
information does not help a firm save the cost of advertising in competition. Instead, better 
information enables the firm to focus its advertising spending on the more valuable consumers. 
The firm can use consumer information to better allocate its marketing resources and improve 
the effectiveness of its target advertising. Proposition 4 summarizes the expected profits of firms 
in competition: 
 
Proposition 4: (a) When firms have symmetric information about the consumer, that is, 
= 1, neither firm makes a positive profit. (b) When firms have asymmetric 
information, that is,  < 1, firm 1’s expected profit is always positive. Firm 2’s expected 
profit is positive when ph > pl and  > 0. Firm 1’s expected profit is always higher than 
firm 2’s expected profit. 
 
Proposition 4 confirms the value of individual-level consumer data in target advertising. 
When = 1, firms have the same information and hence always engage in the head-to-head 
competition. Neither firm makes a positive expected profit in this case. 
When < 1, firm 1 has better consumer information than firm 2. The better-informed 
firm always makes a higher expected profit than the less-informed firm. The expected profit of 
firm 2 depends on the distribution of the firms’ signals. When ph ≤ pl, firm 2 does not make a 
positive expected profit. This result is consistent with the findings in the existing literature on 
common-value auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders [12, 19, 29]. When ph > pl, 
however, firm 2 also makes a positive expected profit when it draws an informative signal (i.e., 
 > 0). This is because firm 2’s signal, even though less accurate, is still private information. 
Firm 1 does not directly observe firm 2’s signal. Propositions 2 and 3 show that firms compete 
less aggressively when ph > pl. In this case, firm 2’s private signal enables firm 2 to reap an 
information rent in the advertising competition. 
It is worth remarking that this finding contributes to the literature on common-value 
auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders. Although some prior studies have identified that 
the less-informed bidder with private information may earn a positive expected profit (e.g., [3, 
18]), the finding was derived in the setting of winner-pay auctions. Our model on the costly 
advertising competition suggests that the less-informed bidder with private information may still 
earn a positive expected profit in the setting of all-pay auctions. In addition, the existing 
literature [3, 12, 18, 29] has separately examined the case where only the better-informed bidder 
earns a positive expected profit and the case where both the better-informed bidder and the less-
informed bidder earn positive profits. This study, in contrast, uses a more generalized model to 
illustrate both cases. 
 
Sharing Consumer Data 
 
 The preceding section characterized the advertising competition when firms have 
asymmetric information about the consumer value. In this section, we examine how the change 
in information asymmetry influences the firm competition. This analysis helps answer the key 
research question, that is, whether the better-informed firm (firm 1) has an incentive to share its 
consumer data with the less-informed firm (firm 2). 
 When firm 1 shares more consumer data with firm 2, the two firms have more similar 
data about the consumer. We use t ∈ [0, 1] to measure the similarity level between the firms’ 
signals S and  When is larger (smaller), the two signals are more (less) similar, or the level 
of information asymmetry is lower (higher). Therefore,  can also be used to represent the 
degree of consumer data sharing. 
 Following the existing literature (e.g., [9]), we consider two possible ways for firm 1 to 
share its consumer data.3 Firm 1 can either give its consumer data to firm 2 for free (i.e., 
voluntary sharing) or sell its consumer data to firm 2 (i.e., paid sharing). The specific 
mechanism of data sharing or trading is not the focus of this study. Instead, we examine the 
feasibility of data sharing to shed light on the viability of consumer data exchange. The 
consumer data exchange is viable only when firms have incentives to share or trade consumer 
data. According to Chen et al. [9], we examine the following two sets of conditions: 
 
1. The conditions for voluntary sharing:  That is, firm 1 is willing 
to give data to firm 2 for free as long as it can make a higher profit by reducing 
information asymmetry. The level of information asymmetry is reduced only if firm 2 
accepts and uses firm 1’s consumer data in target advertising. Therefore voluntary 
sharing happens only if firm 2 is at least not worse off with a reduced level of 
information asymmetry; 
2. The conditions for paid sharing:  That is, firm 1 is 
willing to sell its consumer data to firm 2 only if the monetary compensation of the 
transaction is higher than its loss. This requires that the total profit of the two firms is 
higher with reduced information asymmetry. Also, firm 2 is willing to buy consumer 
data from firm 1 only if it is at least better off after the transaction. 
 
To help understand the effect of information asymmetry on the firm competition, we first 
examine how the change of t influences the firms’ spending in target advertising: 
 
Proposition 5: (a) When ph ≤ pl, both firms’ expected spendings (E[x1] and E[x2]) are 
increasing in  ∈ [0,1]. Moreover,  
 
(i) E[x1|h] is increasing in  for  ∈ [0,1];  
 
(ii)  is increasing in  for ∈ [0,1] (note that E[x1|l] and E[x2|l } ] are 
always zero).  
 
(b) When ph > pl, both firms’ expected spendings (E[x1] and E[x2]) are decreasing in t for 
 ∈ [0, 1 ] and increasing in  for t ∈ ( 1 ,1]. Moreover, E[x1|h] is decreasing in  
for  ∈ [0, 1 ] and increasing in  for  ∈ ( 1 ,1]:  
(i) E[x1|h] is decreasing in  for  ∈ [0, 2 ] and increasing in  for  ∈ ( 2 ,1];  
 
(iii)  is always decreasing in  for ∈ [0,1] (E[x1|l] is always zero); where 1 
< 2. 1 and 2 are defined in the Appendix. 
 
A firm’s competitive aggressiveness can be represented by its expected advertising 
spending. Proposition 5 indicates that reducing information asymmetry has mixed effects on the 
firms’ overall competitive aggressiveness. When t increases, firm 2’s signal is getting closer to 
firm 1’s and information asymmetry decreases. When firm 2 draws  it is more likely that 
firm 1 draws S = h. Therefore, firm 2 is more confident that the consumer is a valuable 
consumer. Firm 2 is thus more willing to advertise. Similarly, when firm 2 draws , it is 
also more likely that firm 1 draws S = l. Therefore, firm 2 is more confident that the consumer is 
a nonvaluable consumer. Firm 2 is thus less willing to advertise. Firm 2’s overall competitive 
aggressiveness is determined by the trade-off between these two countervailing effects. 
When ph ≤ pl, the first effect always dominates the second effect. As a result, the decrease 
in information asymmetry drives firm 2 to be more aggressive and intensifies the firm 
competition. Both firms’ overall expected advertising spendings are increasing in . Also, their 
expected advertising spendings conditional on the high signals are increasing in . Figure 3a 
illustrates the firms’ expected advertising spendings when ph ≤ pl. We let E[V|h] = 10 and ph = 
0.3. 
 
 
 
When ph > pl, the first effect dominates the second effect when  is large but is 
dominated by the second effect when is small. Therefore, firms may compete less aggressively 
when information asymmetry decreases. Proposition 5 shows that firms’ overall expected 
advertising spendings are first decreasing in  when  ∈ [0, 1 ] and then increasing in  
when ∈ ( 1 ,1]. The firms compete the least aggressively when  = 1 . This indicates 
that the firm competition is first softened and then intensified when information asymmetry 
decreases. Figure 3b illustrates firms’ expected advertising spendings when ph > pl. Let E[V|h] = 
10 and ph = 0.8. We have 1 = 0.2525 and 2 = 0.7239. 
The firms’ expected advertising spendings conditional on signals provide more insights 
on the firms’ competitive aggressiveness. When  increases, firm 2 drawing  is more 
confident that the consumer is a nonvaluable consumer. Firm 2 is thus less willing to spend in 
advertising. Its conditional expected spending  is always decreasing in . Firm 2’s less 
aggressiveness when also dampens firm 1’s incentive to compete. This explains why firm 
1’s expected spending conditional on S = h, that is, , is decreasing in when  ∈ [0, 1 
]. But when firm 2 draws S} = h} , it is more confident that the consumer is a valuable consumer. 
Firm 2 is thus more willing to advertise. Firm 2’s more aggressiveness when  motivates 
firm 1 to spend more in advertising. This explains why E[x1|h] is increasing in t when ∈ ( 1 
, 1]. Firm 1’s expected advertising spending when S = h is the lowest when  = 1 . 
In equilibrium, firm 1’s competitive aggressiveness also influences firm 2’s advertising 
strategies when firm 2 draws . That is why firm 2’s expected spending, , changes in 
a similar way as firm 1’s expected advertising spending, . In particular, firm 2’s expected 
advertising spending when  is first decreasing in  when  ∈ [0, 2 ] and then 
increasing in t when  ∈ ( 2 ,1]. Firm 2 advertises the least aggressively when t = t2 . It is 
worth noting that 1 ≤ 2 , which suggests that when information asymmetry decreases, firm 
1 first becomes more aggressive in advertising spending before firm 2 does. This is because firm 
1 does not want firm 2’s improved information to undermine its competitive advantage. Firm 1’s 
better information makes it more confident than firm 2 in increasing spending on target 
advertising. Proposition 6 illustrates the effects of information asymmetry on the firms’ expected 
profits: 
 
Proposition 6: (a) Firm 1’s expected profit is always decreasing in  for  ∈ [0,1]. (b) 
When ph ≤ pl, firm 2’s expected profit is always zero. When ph > pl, firm 2’s expected 
profit is increasing in  for  ∈ [0, 3 ], and decreasing in  for  ∈ ( 3,1] ( 3 
is defined in the Appendix). 
 
When ph ≤ pl, as Proposition 5a shows, the decrease in information asymmetry always 
intensifies the firm competition. Therefore, firm 1’s expected profit is always decreasing in  
(firm 2’s expected profit is always zero). Figure 4a illustrates the firms’ expected profits when ph 
≤ pl. We let E[V|h] = 10 and ph = 0.3. 
When ph > pl, as Proposition 5b shows, the decrease in information asymmetry softens 
the firm competition when the level of information asymmetry is high. One might expect that 
this is a win-win situation and that both firms benefit from the softened competition. However, 
as Proposition 6a shows, firm 1 does not directly benefit from the softened competition. Its 
expected profit is always decreasing in  This is because when firm 1 advertises less, it is also 
less likely to win the consumer. Figure 4b illustrates the firms’ expected profits when ph > pl. We 
let E[V|h] = 10 and ph = 0.8. We have  = 0.6126. 
In contrast, firm 2 may directly benefit from the softened competition when the level of 
information asymmetry is high (i.e.,  is small). When t is small, firms compete less 
aggressively as information asymmetry decreases. Firm 1’s less aggressiveness in competition 
not only helps firm 2 save advertising spending but also enables firm 2 to win the consumer with 
a higher probability. As a result, firm 2 directly benefits from the softened competition and 
obtains a higher expected profit. When t is large, the decrease in information asymmetry drives 
the firms to spend more in advertising. Such intensified competition hurts both firms. Therefore, 
firm 2’s expected profit is increasing in when  ∈ [0, 3 ] and decreasing in  when  ∈ (
3 , 1]. Its expected profit is the highest when  = 3. 
Proposition 6a suggests that  > 0 never holds. Therefore, firm 1 does not directly 
benefit from the softened competition in target advertising and therefore never voluntarily gives 
its consumer data to firm 2 for free. This finding is in contrast to the finding in the existing 
literature. For example, Chen et al. [9] show that a better-informed firm may find it profitable to 
voluntarily give away its consumer data to its competitor when the firms’ targetability is low. 
However, our analysis suggests that such voluntary sharing of consumer information is unlikely 
to occur in a more competitive setting, although information sharing may soften the competition. 
The competition examined in our setting is more competitive than that in Chen et al. [9] for two 
reasons. First, in Chen et al., some consumers still have brand preferences. In contrast, we 
examine the case where the two firms compete head-to-head for the consumer who has no brand 
preference at all. Second, Chen et al. consider a price competition, which is equivalent to a 
winner-pay auction (i.e., the loser does not incur any cost). In contrast, we consider an 
advertising competition, which is equivalent to an all-pay auction (i.e., the loser also incurs the 
advertising cost). As a result, the advertising competition is more costly and the better-informed 
firm finds it even more difficult to directly benefit from the softened competition. However, 
when  (i.e., firm 2 benefits from reduced information asymmetry), firm 1 is willing to 
sell its consumer data to firm 2 as long as  (i.e., the total profit of the two firms 
increases with reduced information asymmetry). Proposition 7 summarizes firm 1’s strategies of 
consumer data sharing: 
 
Proposition 7: (a) Firm 1 never gives away its consumer data to firm 2 for free. (b) When 
ph ≤ (2)
1/2/2 or , firm 1 never sells its consumer data to firm 2. When ph > (2)
1/2/2 
and , firm 1 sells its consumer data to firm 2 to achieve  . Firm 1 charges a price of 
 for the consumer data 
 
Although firm 1 has no incentive to share its consumer data for free, Proposition 7 shows 
that it may sell its consumer data to firm 2 (i.e., paid sharing) under certain circumstances. We 
find that the total profit of the firms becomes higher if firm 1 shares a bit more data with firm 2 
when two conditions hold. First, the likelihood for firm 1 to draw S = h is high enough (i.e., ph > 
(2)1/2/2). Second, the level of information asymmetry between the firms is high enough (i.e., 
). Figure 5 illustrates firm 1’s sharing decision given ph and  
Proposition 7 indicates the importance of consumer data exchanges. Consumer data 
exchanges, such as BlueKai and eXelate, provide marketplaces for individual data owners to 
directly sell and buy consumer data with each other. Our analysis shows that in the competition 
with target advertising, the better-informed firm has the incentive to sell its consumer data (i.e., 
paid sharing). In this regard, the emergence of consumer data exchanges meets the needs of 
consumer data sharing in target advertising. 
Propositions 6 and 7 also provide insights on another important strategic decision— the 
degree of consumer data sharing. The total profit of the two firms is maximized when 
When , the firms’ competition is the least intense, as shown in Proposition 5, and the total 
profit of both firms reaches the highest level. Since  < 1, firm 1 never sells all of its consumer 
data to the competitor. Otherwise, there is no information asymmetry and the firm competition 
becomes more intense, eroding the firms’ profits. Firm 1 sells only part of its consumer data to 
maintain an appropriate level of information asymmetry (i.e., let ). The price that firm 1 
charges is equal to the increase of firm 2’s profit, that is, . Proposition 8 indicates 
how the optimal degree of data sharing t1 changes with ph : 
 
Proposition 8: The optimal degree of consumer data sharing is increasing in ph, that is, 
, when . 
 
Proposition 8 shows that when it is more likely for firm 1 to draw a high signal from its 
consumer data (i.e., ph is higher), firm 1 is willing to sell more data to firm 2. Reducing 
information asymmetry may dampen the advertising competition. The dampening effect of 
reduced information asymmetry is more prominent when firm 1 is more likely to receive a high 
signal S = h. Therefore, firm 1 is willing to sell more consumer data when ph is larger. This result 
generates a positive implication about data selling—when the firms find the consumer market 
good, they are willing to share more data through paid sharing. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This paper uses a common-value all-pay auction framework to examine the competition 
between firms using target advertising. The firms differ in their information about the consumer 
value. The study considers whether the better-informed firm is willing to share its consumer data 
with the less-informed firm. The existing marketing literature [9, 24] largely focuses on the 
competition in which firms provide differentiated products and consumers have heterogeneous 
brand preferences. This study, in contrast, examines the competition in which firms provide 
identical products and consumers have no brand preference. This setting better captures the e-
commerce competition using online consumer behavioral data that mainly reflects consumers’ 
purchase intent on products rather than brands. The study shows that even when firms compete 
head-to-head for the same consumers, reducing information asymmetry between the firms may 
still soften the competition. In addition, the finding suggests that the better-informed firm is not 
willing to give away its consumer data for free. However, it has the incentive to sell the 
information at a price. The insights generated from this study help explain why consumer data 
sharing occurs even between homogeneous firms that compete head-to-head. 
The findings of this study complement the existing literature on interfirm sharing of 
consumer data. As firms collect more consumer data over time, firms are able to better 
distinguish between loyal consumers and comparison shoppers. Prior studies (e.g., [9, 24]) 
suggest that information sharing benefits competing firms by inducing them to compete less 
aggressively on each other’s loyal customers. These studies also suggest that information sharing 
intensifies the competition on comparison shoppers when firms can accurately distinguish 
comparison shoppers from loyal consumers. Our study shows that information sharing may also 
soften the firms’ competition on shoppers. An important managerial implication is that firms can 
adopt different strategies to share the data about loyal customers and the data about comparison 
shoppers. 
Another interesting finding of this study is that despite their information difference, the 
better-informed firm and the less-informed firm spend the same amount on average in target 
advertising on a consumer. In other words, better information does not help the better-informed 
firm save the cost of advertising in competition. Instead, better information improves the 
effectiveness of target advertising. The better-informed firm can use its information to focus its 
spending on the more promising consumers. As a result, the better-informed firm’s expected 
profit from individual targeting is higher than that of the less-informed firm. 
The findings of this study also help justify the emerging business models of online 
consumer data exchanges. Our analysis shows that when firms compete in target advertising, the 
better-informed firm may be willing to sell its consumer data to its competitor. Consumer data 
exchanges provide trading platforms or marketplaces for firms to trade consumer data. When 
firms are willing to buy/sell consumer data, they have the incentive to join consumer data 
exchanges. Firms will eventually benefit from such data trading in their advertising competition. 
The finding on consumer data sharing in this study suggests that the trade of consumer 
data can be influenced by the condition of the consumer market. For example, the results suggest 
that when the better-informed firm is less likely to draw a good signal about the consumer value, 
consumer data sharing is less likely to happen. However, when the better-informed firm is more 
likely to draw a good signal, it may sell its data. In this regard, when the market conditions are 
good (e.g., the majority of consumers are valuable consumers and it is, in general, more likely 
for a firm to draw good signals from its consumer data), the selling of consumer data is more 
likely to occur and the better-informed firm is willing to sell more data. 
The study provides opportunities for future research. First, firms often share consumer 
data through third-party organizations such as customer data intermediaries [31] and trade 
associations [39]. The role of these third-party organizations in sharing individual-level data 
about consumers is worth further study. Second, this paper focuses on the case where the better-
informed firm has more data on the same consumer. Future studies could examine the case that 
the better-informed firm’s data does not completely encompass the less informed firm’s data. 
Lastly, future studies could investigate the privacy issues and policy implications on consumer 
data sharing. 
 
Notes 
 
1. This assumption is used to reduce the complexity of the analysis. The insights in this 
paper hold for the much more complex case where firm 1 draws from a valuable 
consumer a high signal with probability y and a low signal with a positive probability 1 – 
 where   
2. A less likely case is that although firms target the same consumer, they receive 
completely independent signals about the same consumer. This analysis is left for future 
research.  
3. Chen [6] considers three possible ways to share consumer data. The third option is that 
firms exchange consumer data with one another. In our paper, this option is not 
applicable because firm 1’s consumer data is richer than firm 2’s, and such an exchange 
cannot improve firm 1’s data. 
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Lemma 1 
 
Since , we have 
 
 
 
The consumer’s expected value given a signal  can be represented by 
 
 
 
Where  and  are posterior probabilities. Based on Bayes’s rule, there are 
 
 
 
Where  Since we have  
 
 
 
From Equation (1), we have 
 
 
 
Comparing  and , we get  We therefore have  Also, since 
, we get 
 
 
 
Combining Equations (A1), (A2), and (A3), we have 
 
 
 
Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
 
Let  denote firm 1’s expected profit of spending x1 in target advertising when . 
Let  denote firm 2’s expected profit of spending x2 in target advertising when . 
Let  denote the upper bound and lower bound of firm 1’s advertising spendings, 
respectively, given S. Let  denote firm 2’s upper bound and lower bound of advertising 
spending, respectively, given .  
 
 
 
Proof: When firm 1 has S = l, it expects that the value of the consumer is . Therefore, 
firm 1 will not spend more than zero, that is, . Firm 1’s expected profit given S = l is 
zero, that is,  = 0. Q.E.D. 
 The upper and lower bounds of the firms’ advertising spendings satisfy the following 
conditions: ; and  
 Since E[V|l] = 0, the firms’ profit functions can be written as 
 
 
 
 
Proof: Suppose  The supports of  and  overlap on . In the mixed-
strategy equilibrium, when firm 2 has , its expected profit of spending  in 
advertising is constant; similarly, when firm 2 has , its expected profit of spending 
 in advertising is constant. Therefore, the value   should be 
constant. However, 
 
 
 
Since  is constant only if  The condition 
suggests that firm 1’s lower bound of its CDF when S = h is not lower than Therefore, we 
cannot have  
 Suppose  There is a gap between the supports for  and . As a result, 
firm 1 will never spend a value in . Firm 1 will not spend at either. This is because 
and lead to the same probability of winning but firm 1 pays more at  Consequently, firm 2 
never spends either, which contradicts the fact that is firm 2’s lower bound of marketing 
spending when it receives  
 To summarize, we cannot have either  The only possibility is 
 We define  Q.E.D. 
 
  
 
Proof: Suppose . We define . We next prove that firms put no mass point at 
. Suppose that firm 2 puts a mass point at . Firm 1 has an incentive to put a mass point at 
 to beat firm 2 and win the consumer. Then will not be the upper bounds of the CDFs. 
Therefore, we cannot have firm 2 putting a mass point at .  
 Suppose firm 2 does not have a mass point at  but firm 1 does. If  firm 2 has an 
incentive to put a mass point at  Then will not be the upper bounds of the CDFs. If 
 then firm 2’s expected profit when spending is 
 
 
 
Therefore, we cannot have firm 1 putting a mass point at either. 
 In summary, there is no mass point at for both firms’ advertising spending distribution. 
Q.E.D. 
 So far, we can conclude that (1) the support for , (2) the support for 
 is , and (3) the support for .  
 
  
 
Proof: Suppose  From Equation (A6), we have 
 
 
To satisfy , we must have  is positive only when either of the 
following cases is true: (1)  or (2)  and firm 1 has a mass point at . Q.E.D. 
 We next show that the first case, , and firm 1 has a mass point at  cannot be 
true. Since firms cannot both have a mass point at a boundary simultaneously in equilibrium, if 
firm 1 has a mass point at , we must have = 0 and . Considering 
Equation (A4), we have 
 
 
 
If  and  is nonpositive. However, this cannot be true as we 
proved above. Therefore, the second case cannot be true. 
 In conclusion, firm 2 must make a zero expected profit when , that is,  
Q.E.D.  
We therefore can develop the following conjectures based on Lemma A5: 
 
 
 
We first consider Conjecture 1 and derive the firms’ advertising spending distributions. 
From , we have 
 
 
 
  
 
Proof: By Lemma A4 and Equation (A7), we have . Therefore, 
. Q.E.D. 
 
  
 
Proof: Suppose . From Lemma A3, we must have . From Equations (A6) and 
(A7), we have 
 
 
 
Because , we have . This contradicts the fact that . To ensure that 
, we must have . Therefore, we have . It is easy to verify that 
= 1. In other words,  has no mass point at . We conclude that firm 2 spends 
zero when it has , that is, 
 
 
 
Q.E.D.  
We can rewrite firm 1’s expected profit given any advertising spending as 
 
 
 
 By Lemmas A4 and A6, we can conclude that its profit is  when 
firm 1 receives S = h. Based on Equation (A8), we have 
 
 
 
 In this case, the equilibrium strategies of firms’ competition can be summarized as 
follows: 
 
(a) When S = l, firm 1 spends zero in target advertising (i.e., no targeting). When S = h, 
firm 1 spends in target advertising according to 
 
 
 
(b) When , firm 2 spends zero in target advertising. When , firm 2 spends in 
target advertising according to  
 
 
 
We can verify that the sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of this equilibrium is 
 Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
 
We consider the case ph > pl . We next show that there exist , and  such that 
in equilibrium, firm 2 randomizes over when it receives  and over  when it 
receives . Firm 1 randomizes over  when it receives S = h.  
 Lemma A5 gives . From , we have 
 
 
From Lemma A4 and the constant profit of the mixed-strategy equilibrium, we have 
 
 
 
And 
 
 
 
We therefore can derive 
 
 
 
In the mixed-strategy equilibrium, we must have  and , therefore 
we can derive the following conditions: 
 
 
 
Where  from Equation (A10). Solving Equations (A14) and (A15), we get 
 
 
  
 
Proof: From Equations (A10) and (A13), we have 
 
1. When x1 = 0, F1 (x1|h) = 0 and when x2 = 0, ;  
2. If , we have and . This cannot be true because firms cannot 
both have a mass point at the lower bound. Therefore, in equilibrium, 
and . Only firm 2 has a mass point at the lower 
bound. Q.E.D. 
 
 When ph > pl, the equilibrium strategies of firms’ competition can be summarized as 
follows: 
(a) When S = l, firm 1 spends zero in target advertising. When S = h, firm 1 spends 
in target advertising according to 
 
(b) When , firm 2 spends in target advertising according to 
 
 
 
 When , firm 2 spends in target advertising according to 
 
 
 
We can verify that the sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of the second 
equilibrium is pl < ph 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
 
When ph ≤ pl, firm 1’s expected advertising spendings are 
 
 
Firm 2’s expected advertising spendings are 
 
 
 
Comparing Equations (A17) and (A19), we have  Comparing the values in 
Equations (A16) and (A18), we have . 
When ph > pl, firm 1’s expected advertising spendings are 
 
 
 Firm 2’s expected advertising spending is 
 
 
 
Comparing Equations (A21) and (A23), we have . Comparing the values in 
Equations (A20) and (A22), we have . 
 In summary, we have that  always holds. When  
. When . Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4  
When , firm 1’s expected profit is 
 
 
 
Firm 2’s expected profit is always zero regardless of the signal. Thus, .  
 When . The firms’ expected profits are 
 
 
 
 We can verify that  always holds. Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5  
 
When ph ≤ pl, we have 
 
 
And 
 
 
 
 When ph > pl, we have the following formulas: 
 
 
 
when and  when , where 
 
 
 
 
when and  when ; 
 
 
 
when  and  when , where 
;  
 
 
 
 as long as . Since ,  
always holds.  
 We can verify that  always holds. Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 6  
 
When ph ≤ pl, we have 
 
 
 
When ph > pl, we have the following formulas: 
 
 
 and  where Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 7 
 
Proposition 6 gives . Therefore, firm 1 never gives its consumer data to firm 2 for 
free. 
 When ,  
 
 
 
we have . Therefore, firm 1 has no incentive to sell its consumer data to firm 
2. 
 
When ph > pl, 
 
 
 
we have 
 
 
 
 when  and . Firm 1 has an incentive to sell its consumer data to 
firm 2 to achieve  when . Based on Proposition 6,  if . Since 
, firm 2 is willing to purchase the consumer data when .  
 Note  when . In summary, when  or , firm 1 never shares 
consumer data with firm 2. When  and , firm 1 has an incentive to sell 
consumer data with firm 2 and achieve . Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 8  
 
Based on Proposition 5, we have that . Differentiating 
 with respect to  , we have  when . Q.E.D. 
 
